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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
PUBLIC LAW
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCEDURE
Paul R. Baier*
AGENCY LAW
School Boards
Samuel Johnson, Boswell tells us, "upon all occasions,
expressed his approbation of enforcing instruction by means
of the rod."' The good Dr. Johnson lived in the eighteenth
century, yet as everybody knows the problem of discipline in
our schools is still with us. Whether the rod can be used today
in Louisiana's elementary schools was the question in Roy v.
Continental Ins. Co., 2 and the Third Circuit Court of Appehl
in a worthy opinion by Judge Domengeaux opined the John-
sonian view. The swat, it seems, is still with us.
For the first time now in Louisiana school law a court of
appeal has held that "corporal punishment, reasonable in
degree, administered by a teacher to a pupil for disciplinary
reasons, is permitted in Louisiana. '3 Judge Domengeaux dis-
tinguished a number of cases in which the punishment ad-
ministered was excessive.4 In Roy, the court felt, the punish-
ment was reasonable-a few swats in the classic area.
In upholding the teacher's use of the paddle, the court of
appeal noted that nothing in Louisiana law expressly pro-
hibits the use of corporal punishment in the classroom.
Furthermore, Louisiana Civil Code article 220 suggests that
* Associate Professor of Law, Louisiana State University.
1. J. BOSWELL, LiFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, LL.D. 7 (1791). Whether
Johnson's reasoning makes any sense is for the reader: " 'I would rather (said
he) have the rod to be the general terror to all, to make them learn, than tell
a child, if you do thus, or thus, you will be more esteemed than your brothers
or sisters. The rod produces an effect which terminates in itself. A child is
afraid of being whipped, and gets his task, and there's an end on't; whereas,
by exciting emulation and comparisons of superiority, you lay the foundation
of lasting mischief; you make brothers and sisters hate each other.' " Id. I
owe this reference and much else to my dear friend and esteemed correspon-
dent at Claremont College, Jas. Viator.
2. 313 So. 2d 349 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
3. Id. at 354.
4. Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Bd., 223 La. 966, 67 So. 2d 553
(1953); Johnson v. Horace Mann Mut. Ins. Co., 241 So. 2d 588 (La. App. 2d Cir.
1970); Frank v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1967), cert. denied, 250 La. 635, 297 So. 2d 653 (1967).
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teachers, who stand in the parents' place in the classroom,
have the authority to paddle unruly students.5 Because a
teacher has the duty of maintaining discipline and good order
in the schools, the third circuit thought it necessary that he
have the means, including reasonable corporal punishment,
of enforcing prompt discipline. In the court's view, to hold
otherwise would "encourage students to flaunt the authority
of their teachers, and effectively shackle the teaching profes-
sion at a time of rising disciplinary problems in the schools."
Clearly, as far as the need for discipline in the schools is
concerned, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal agrees with
Hugo Black, who said in Tinker v. Des Moines School District7
that "sometimes the old and the tried and true are worth
holding," including rigorous discipline of students in the class-
room. But when there are two views, it would seem best to
leave arguments about the appropriateness of different forms
of student discipline to the school officials themselves, and
not to the judges. The court's opinion in the Roy case is
consistent with the idea of limited judicial review of the policy
determinations of school boards, an idea acknowledged in the
cases.8
Whether the United States Constitution prohibits or
limits the use of corporal punishment in the schools remains
to be seen. The issue has not been settled yet, although some
cases in the reports suggest that the Federal Constitution
does not require sparing the rod.9
5. "Fathers and mothers may, during their life, delegate a part of their
authority to teachers, schoolmasters and others to whom they intrust their
children for their education, such as the power of reasonable restraint and
correction, so far as may be necessary to answer the purposes for which they
employ them." LA. CIV. CODE art. 220.
6. Roy v. Continental Ins. Co., 313 So. 2d 349, 354 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974),
quoting Frank v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 195 So. 2d 451, 454 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1967).
7. 393 U.S. 503, 524 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting).
8. See State ex rel. Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 206 La. 317, 19
So. 2d 153 (1943).
9. In its opinion in Roy the third circuit cited Ingraham v. Wright, 498
F.2d 248 (5th Cir. 1974), the leading federal case, for the proposition that the
federal courts have consistently held that corporal punishment, reasonably
imposed, is not violative of constitutional rights, including due process, equal
protection, and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. How-
ever, the Fifth Circuit has granted a rehearing en bane in the Ingraham
case, 504 F.2d 1379 (1974), and there is no final judgment on the merits of the
case to date.
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A large number of cases decided during the 1974-1975
term concern the Teachers' Tenure Law;10 these cases involve
teachers who had lost either their jobs, their pay, or their
position. The tight economy apparently precipitated most of
these cases, and it is evident from the reports that the judges'
job interpreting tenure laws is especially delicate in hard
times.
Boddie v. Jackson Parish School Board" turned on an
easy idea: unless a teacher is hired on in the first place, she
has no rights under the tenure laws. In Boddie the school
board rejected plaintiff's application for employment, but she
sued the board anyway, claiming de facto employment. The
second circuit affirmed dismissal of her suit. "In order for
plaintiff to be entitled to the protection of the Teachers' Ten-
ure Law," said the court, "plaintiff must be an employee of
the school system with the status of probationary teacher. '12
On the evidence presented the court ruled plaintiff was never
employed and she did not acquire tenure status. Moreover,
without the written contract required by law,' 3 plaintiff was
in no position to complain.14 The court did acknowledge, how-
ever, that a case of de facto employment according tenure
status might arise under extenuating circumstances, not
present in Boddie.'5
Castille v. Evangeline Parish School Board'6 involves a
significant improvement in the jurisprudence. Unlike the first
circuit's opinion last term in Serignet v. Livingston Parish
School Board,'7 an opinion that obliterated "the hard line
which the law has always drawn between probationary
teachers and those with tenure,"' 8 the third circuit has flatly
held:
10. LA. R.S. 17:441-45 (1950).
11. 312 So. 2d 681 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
12. Id. at 683.
13. See LA. R.S. 17:413 (1950) which sets forth "prerequisites for employ-
ment" and provides in part that "No person shall be appointed to teach
without a written contract for the scholastic year in which the teaching is to
be done."
14. Accord, State ex rel. Golson v. Winn Parish School Bd., 9 So. 2d 342
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1942); Lanier v. Catahoula Parish School Bd., 154 So. 469
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1934).
15. 312 So. 2d at 685.
16. 304 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974).
17. 282 So. 2d 761 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1973).
18. The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1978-1974 Term-
Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 35 LA. L. REV. 349, 359
(1975).
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There is no requirement in R.S. 17:422 for notice to a
probationary teacher of the superintendent's reasons for
recommending dismissal. Nor is there a requirement that
such a teacher be given a hearing or an opportunity to
rebut the charges. Hence, none were necessary. 19
It remains now for the Louisiana Supreme Court to decide
which interpretation of Louisiana R.S. 17:422 is correct.20
Once tenure attaches, as it had in McGraw v. Iberia
Parish School Board,21 the results are quite different. With-
out notice or hearing and without a whisper of justification,
John McGraw was terminated as an assistant superinten-
dent, his pay was cut, and he was bumped to a lower status.
He refused his new position and instead sued his school board
under the tenure laws. He won. And it is reassuring that the
same court that rebuffed Castille's case 22 could so firmly de-
cide in favor of John McGraw. The difference, of course, is
that between the probationary side of the line and the ten-
ured side, and with this latest tenure case, the third circuit
has redrawn the hard line. 23
Mouras v. Jefferson Parish School Board24 sustains a
school board's reduction of the local salary supplement of
public school principals and assistant principals. The reduc-
tion applied to entire categories of tenured personnel, not just
to one teacher's pay, and therefore was not a disciplining,
removal, or demotion prohibited by the tenure laws. The prin-
cipals and assistants, unlike regular classroom teachers, had
received extra paychecks in previous years, so for the school
board, in a tight fiscal year, to reverse its policy of extra
paychecks to this one group alone was not unfairly dis-
criminatory. Since the classification was not arbitrary for
19. 304 So. 2d at 703.
20. Although the third circuit did not reach the issue in Castille v.
Evangeline Parish School Bd., 304 So.. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), there
would seem to be no constitutional requirement of notice and an opportunity
to be heard before discharge of a non-tenured, probationary teacher. At least
this is the latest ruling of the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
LaBorde v. Franklin Parish School Bd., 510 F.2d 590 (5th Cir. 1975).
21. 310 So. 2d 139 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
22. Castille v. Evangeline Parish School Bd., 304 So. 2d 701 (La. App. 3d
Cir. 1974).
23. Thus the third circuit has eliminated the confusion which used to
exist in that circuit regarding the distinct procedures applicable to probation-
ary and to tenured teachers. Compare its latest holding with Fleming v.
Concordia Parish School Bd., 275 So. 2d 795 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1973).
24. 300 So. 2d 540 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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purposes of increasing one class's pay, it was not arbitrary for
purposes of decreasing that class's pay.25 Judge Redmann,
writing for the fourth circuit, acknowledged that some people
might disagree with the school board on what the salaries of
principals should be; some might think it wise to take other
economies in order to raise principals' pay. Nonetheless the
court responded:
But these are not judicial questions. We have not been
elected to the legislature; we have not been elected to the
school board. Our function is not to apportion funds, but
to decide each case under the law, and to order whatever
remedy the law provides.26
To effect a proper dismissal of a probationary teacher,
both the school superintendent and the school board must
comply literally with the terms of the applicable statute,
Louisiana R.S. 17:422, and Louisiana courts have invariably
insisted on procedural regularity under the tenure laws, 27
sometimes at very high costs to the affected school board. In
Palone v. Jefferson Parish School Board28 the Louisiana Su-
preme Court ordered the reinstatement of four assistant prin-
cipals whose positions had been abolished by the school board
as an economy measure. There was no evidence in the case
that the school board acted in bad faith; it was suffering a
substantial deficit and adopted a resolution abolishing the
position of second assistant principal in order to reduce ex-
penditures. But section 44229 says that the school board may
take action only upon the written recommendation of the
superintendent of schools, accompanied by valid reasons.
Here the superintendent had made no recommendation to the
board concerning its resolution. The court was unimpressed
25. Id.
26. Id. at 542. Judge Redmann's opinion in the Mouras case is typical of
his superb style. He is usually quite to the point-like Holmes was. Holmes'
Buck v. Bell opinion, 274 U.S. 200 (1927), comes immediately to mind. Holmes'
opinions were short and pungent, and so are Judge Redmann's. For more on
this style point, see PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 285-86 (1951).
27. See State v. Bienville Parish School Bd., 198 La. 688, 4 So. 2d 649
(1941); State ex rel. Kennington v. Red River Parish School Bd., 193 So. 225
(La. App. 2d Cir. 1939); The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the
1978-1974 Term-Administrative Regulation: Law and Procedure, 35 LA. L.
REV. 349, 358 (1975).
28. 306 So. 2d 679 (La. 1975).
29. LA. R.S. 17:442 (1950).
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with the rationale that a written recommendation was not
required, because the school board's action affected an entire
group of school personnel. "The Teachers' Tenure Act . . .
applies whether the action taken affects only one teacher or
several teachers. ' 30 Accordingly, the court ordered plaintiffs
reinstated in their positions as assistant principals, presum-
ably with back pay.
The result in the Palone case seems an especially harsh
one. In effect the court's judgment requires the school board
to fund four positions (at least during the course of the litiga-
tion and until proper termination procedures) for which no
monies were available in the first place. It would seem that
the Teachers' Tenure Law was not meant to guarantee job
security when there are no jobs. The court is quite right on
the procedural point in the case: the superintendent made no
recommendation himself to abolish the second assistant prin-
cipal category. But the circumstances in the Palone case were
extraordinary, and the court in its opinion gives too little
weight to the financial crisis confronting the school board.
The First Circuit Court of Appeal's opinion in McCoy v.
Tangipahoa School Board,31 also ordering reinstatement of a
tenured school principal, closely tracks the reasoning of the
Palone case.3 2 McCoy holds that failure of a school board to
comply with Louisiana R.S. 17:442-43 regarding proper termi-
nation procedures is not excused by the fact that a federal
court desegregation order had closed plaintiff's school, leav-
ing him without a job. These integration orders, according to
an established line of cases,33 may not adversely affect ten-
ured school teachers, who are entitled to transfer to some
other position of equal dignity and pay.
One statement in the McCoy opinion is questionable, al-
though it reflects the supreme court's view. The court of ap-
peal said that if no comparable position was available to
McCoy, he was nevertheless entitled to continuance of pay for
the position of principal.34 Again this results in guaranteeing
30. Palone v. Jefferson Parish School Bd., 306 So. 2d 679, 682 (La. 1975).
31. 308 So. 2d 382 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 386-87.
33. See Dantone v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 279 So. 2d 779 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973); Pardue v. Livingston Parish School Bd., 251 So. 2d 833
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1971).
34. McCoy v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 308 So. 2d 382, 387 (La. App.
1st Cir. 1975), citing Dantone v. Tangipahoa Parish School Bd., 279 So. 2d 779
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job security to a teacher when there is no job, and it is
doubtful that the tenure laws were meant to extend protec-
tion this far, at least in ordinary circumstances. If economic
necessity, rather than a federal court integration order,
forced the closing of a school, one would not expect the
school's faculty to have rights to continued employment at
the same pay elsewhere.
Louisiana Teachers' Ass'n v. Orleans Parish School
Board35 is a brave opinion with far-reaching consequences for
public employee collective bargaining in this state. The fourth
circuit, with Judge Lemmon writing a carefully reasoned
opinion for the majority, has held that a school board, inci-
dental to its statutory authority to hire teachers and fix their
salaries,36 may bargain collectively with an agent selected by
the school teachers, if the board in its discretion thinks im-
plementation of collective bargaining will more efficiently ac-
complish its employment objectives. The court reasoned that
Louisiana's public policy favors self-organization by em-
ployees in the private sector.3 7 No law expressly prohibits
a school board or other public agency from recognizing a
collective bargaining agent. And the court's majority could
see no reason founded on public policy why collective bargain-
ing should not be allowed in the public sector "when the
public employer in its discretion has willingly decided to
utilize this method of conducting its labor relations. ' 38 Since
the Orleans Parish School Board in its wisdom favored recog-
nition of a bargaining agent for its teachers, the court spe-
cifically declined to examine the merits of the Board's action
as not within the judicial function.39
Milk Commission
Members of the Louisiana Milk Commission successfully
fended off the State Ethics Commission this term in an attack
(La. App. 1st Cir. 1973); State ex rel. Parker v. Vernon Parish School Bd., 225
La. 297, 72 So. 2d 512 (1954).
35. 303 So. 2d 564 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
36. See LA. R.S. 17:81 (1963).
37. See LA. R.S. 23:822 (1964).
38. 303 So. 2d at 567-68.
39. Judge Samuel dissented in the case. According to him, by recognizing
a bargaining agent the board would unlawfully surrender some of its
decision-making authority. In addition, because of the magnitude and com-
plexity of the step taken by the board "the matter appears to be one which
addresses itself to express legislative action." Id. at 570.
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based upon alleged conflict of interest among Milk Commis-
sion members. By statute, three members of the Milk Com-
mission must be milk processors and one member must be a
milk producer.4 0 To the Ethics Commission, these qualifica-
tions necessarily involved the Milk Commission in conflict of
interest, since at least four of its members served while own-
ing an economic interest in the dairy industry. The Ethics
Commission issued an opinion holding that Louisiana R.S.
42:1111(H) prohibits membership on the Milk Commission by
persons who are producers, handlers, retailers, or otherwise
engaged in the dairy industry. But the First Circuit Court of
Appeal reversed the Ethics Commission, holding that the
commission acted ultra vires when it condemned the mem-
bership of the Milk Commission for an alleged conflict of in-
terest.4 1 Nowhere in the act creating the Ethics Commission,
the court held, is the Ethics Commission authorized to change
the qualifications of members of the Milk Commission, and
the legislature's statutory requirement of industry represen-
tation on the Milk Commission is final.
Civil Service
The scope of the remedy for wrongful discharge of clas-
sified fire fighters was before the Louisiana Supreme Court
this term in Hebbler v. New Orleans Fire Department.4 2 The
narrow question in the case was whether the New Orleans
Fire Department, the agency which had wrongfully dis-
charged Hebbler, was liable to him for state supplemental pay
as well as for city base pay. Under Louisiana R.S. 49:113 an
employing agency must reimburse a wrongfully discharged
employee for "all salaries and wages withheld during the
period of illegal separation." Hebbler argued that "all salaries
and wages withheld" includes state supplemental pay for
firemen. The supreme court agreed. The statute, the court
ruled, makes no distinction as to the source of the salaries
and wages of an illegally discharged employee. Moreover,
Hebbler's state supplemental pay was lost directly as a result
of his illegal discharge by the New Orleans Fire Department;
accordingly, he was entitled to be reimbursed for his entire
40. See also LA. R.S. 40:940.16 (1965).
41. Louisiana Milk Comm'n v. Louisiana Comm'n on Gov'tal Ethics, 298
So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
42. 310 So. 2d 113 (La. 1975), reversing Hebbler v. New Orleans Fire Dep't,
299 So. 2d 825 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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loss, including lost supplemental pay, by his employing
agency.
Clearly the supreme court is right in Hebbler to say that
the legislative intent is to make a reinstated employee whole
for his loss during the period of illegal separation from
employment. The court's new rule facilitates that end, and is
thus a worthy development in the law of remedies for wrong-
ful discharge in civil service cases.
Flores v. State Department of Civil Service43 settles an
important question for the civil service practitioner; it holds
that judicial review of civil service commission rulings lies
only in the appropriate court of appeal and not in the district
courts. Judicial review in civil service cases is thus in the
nature of an appeal and not trial de novo.4 4 The First Circuit
Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the general judi-
cial review provision of the Louisiana Administrative Proce-
dure Act 45 authorizes review in the district court, and the
supreme court denied writs, pointing out that the Louisiana
constitution expressly provides that appeals from civil ser-
vice commissions are to be taken exclusively to the appellate
courts .
46
In at least three cases decided during the term the courts
of appeal reversed civil service commission rulings, ordering
either that the aggrieved employee be reinstated or that the
commission hold a new hearing on the matter. Biggio v. De-
partment of Safety & Permits47 is especially important for
civil service administration. It bluntly rejects the view that a
classified employee can be dismissed from the civil service on
the theory that he is not the "best man" for the job. This
theory, the court of appeal held, is arbitrary on its face and
undermines the protection accorded civil service personnel by
the state constitution. The court reasoned that no classified
employee would be safe in his job if the appointing authority
were allowed to replace him on such intangibles as leader-
ship, imagination, and innovativeness. Furthermore:
It is easy to see the chaotic condition which would result
if the Appointing Authority were permitted to search out
43. 308 So. 2d 393 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
44. It should be noted that under the provisions of the Constitution of
1974 appellate review is granted on both law and fact. LA. CONsT. art. X, § 12.
45. LA. R.S. 49:964(A) (Supp. 1966).
46. Flores v. State Dep't of Civil Services, 310 So. 2d 855 (La. 1975).
47. 299 So. 2d 504 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
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and seek the "best man" for every classified position. The
will of the people in passing a constitutionally guaranteed
system of Civil Service would thus be ignored and the job
protection offered by the system would cease to exist.48
The court is probably right in Biggio to repudiate, in the
name of the people, the best man theory for Louisiana's civil
service administration; the risks of abuse under that system
are apparent, and the constitution would seem to preclude
the practice anyway.
Bennett v. Division of Administration49 rightly holds that
serious misconduct justifies dismissal from the civil service,
notwithstanding its occurrence before employment begins. To
rule otherwise would confer an unwarranted immunity for
civil service employees that would seriously limit review of
their fitness to hold civil service employment.
Golphin v. Division of Administration50 reverses an order
of the Civil Service Commission on procedural grounds. In
this case the commission erred, the court said, when it re-
fused to hear evidence offered by the civil service employee to
show he was discriminated against by his immediate super-
visor. The Louisiana Constitution of 1921 required that a civil
servant who is fired be given a chance to show bias on the
part of the appointing authority as the real reason for his
discharge, 5 1 notwithstanding express charges indicating
another cause for the discharge. The court's ruling in Golphin
seems correct in light of the earlier jurisprudence. 52
Under Louisiana law the Civil Service Commission may
modify the penalty imposed by an appointing authority if the
commission thinks a modification is warranted.53 In Pendley
v. Louisiana Division of Administration54 the First Circuit
Court of Appeal reversed the commission because the com-
mission failed to consider whether a modification of the pen-
alty that was imposed in the case was in order. However, the
commission did its job under the law, including the review of
48. Id. at 512.
49. 307 So. 2d 118 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
50. 314 So. 2d 498 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
51. La. Const. art. XIV, § 15(A)(1) (1921).
52. King v. Dep't of Public Safety, 234 La. 409, 100 So. 2d 217 (1958);
Cormier v. State Dep't of Institutions, 212 So. 2d 143 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1968).
53. See Dickson v. Richardson, 236 La. 668, 109 So. 2d 51 (1959); Brickman
v. Orleans Aviation Bd., 236 La. 143, 107 So. 2d 422 (1958).
54. 303 So. 2d 544 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
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the penalty, 55 and the first circuit's review of the commis-
sion's work in the case seems unduly strained; the court
should have affirmed.
Department of Public Safety
The first circuit has decided that the provisions of the
Louisiana Administrative Procedure Act apply to the De-
partment of Public Safety, including the rule that an order of
the Department suspending a driver's license is subject to
rehearing within ten days from the date of the order's en-
try.56 Other cases during the term in this category of agency
law presented constitutional challenges to the Louisiana Im-
plied Consent Law, but the courts of appeal continued to
reject these attacks.5 7 Under Louisiana law5 8 a driver does
not enjoy the right to Miranda warnings, or to the presence of
counsel, before deciding whether to submit to the chemical
test prescribed by the statute;5 9 and these tests themselves,
55. In denying Pendley's appeal, the ciVil service commission said: "The
Commission cannot, as appellant contends, properly substitute its judgment
for that of the appointing authority unless . . . it believes that the punish-
ment inflicted for the conduct complained of is so flagrantly out of balance
that the disciplinary action should be reduced. In the case before us there is
sufficient cause for discipline and the severity of the discipline is not dispro-
portionate to the conduct which provoked it." 303 So. 2d at 547-48. This
excerpt from the commission's opinion in the case suggests that the commis-
sion was fully aware of its powers to modify the penalty but believed mod-
ification inappropriate in Pendley's case.
56. Young v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 298 So. 2d 298 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1974).
57. See Green v. Dep't of Public Safety, 308 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975); Harrison v. State Dep't of Public Safety, 298 So. 2d 312 (La. App. 4th
Cir.), cert. denied, 300 So. 2d 840 (La. 1974).
58. The relevant jurisprudence was nicely summarized in one case this
term, Swan v. Dep't of Public Safety, 311 So. 2d 498, 500 (La. App. 4th Cir.
1975).
59. In one case decided during the 1974-1975 term a disgruntled driver
whose license was revoked sued the Public Safety Department claiming that
its chemical test was invalid in two respects. First, the driver claimed that
the test had not been approved by the Department of Health; and, secondly,
he claimed that, to be valid, the photoelectric intoximeter test which is
administered should consist of two paris, and not just one. The supreme
court rejected both these claims, however. There was no evidence in the
record to show that the test offered in the case was invalid, either legally or
scientifically. And the court noted: "The fact that this is an action for judicial
review of an administrative hearing does not change the burden of proof
placed by law on the plaintiff." Meyer v. State Dep't of Public Safety License
Control & Driver Improvement Division, 312 Sq. 2d 289, 292 (La. 1975).
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under the law, do not violate the right against self-incrim-
ination.
In two cases decided during the term, however, the court
of appeal reversed the Department of Public Safety for pro-
cedural flaws in suspending drivers' licenses. Green v. De-
partment of Public Safety60 reverses the Department because
it did not afford the driver an opportunity for the administra-
tive hearing required by statute. Neely v. Department of Pub-
lic Safety61 reverses because the police officer's report in the
case was not a sworn report, also required by the provisions
of Louisiana R.S. 32:662. Another case, Hendrix v. Depart-
ment of Public Safety, 6 2 holds that the words "shall suspend"
in Louisiana R.S. 32:667 are mandatory, not permissive, and
that a district court has no jurisdiction to limit the Depart-
ment's suspension of a driver's license in hardship cases.
Department of Employment Security
In National Gypsum Company v. Administrator, Louisiana
Department of Employment Security, the Louisiana Su-
preme Court, reversing the fourth circuit,6 has held that
unemployment due to a lockout by the employer is not caused
by "a labor dispute which is in active progress," within the
meaning of Louisiana R.S. 23:1601(4), and hence employees
who are locked out by their employer during contract negoti-
ations can collect unemployment compensation. Justice Tate's
majority opinion distinguishes Senegal v. Lake Charles Steve-
dores, Inc.,65 in which the court held that striking employees
are not entitled to unemployment benefits. During a strike
employees voluntarily leave their jobs, whereas during a
lockout they are forced out of the plant by the employer.
Since the state's position with respect to labor-management
relations during contract negotiations is supposed to be
strictly neutral, to deny unemployment benefits to employees
who are locked out would, in the majority's view, "add a
sanction not contemplated by law to conduct by the employer
designed to withhold subsistence from his workers and their
60. 308 So. 2d 863 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1975).
61. 308 So. 2d 881 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1975).
62. 311 So. 2d 547 (La. App. d Cir. 1975).
63. 313 So. 2d 230 (La. 1975).
64. National Gypsum Co. v. Administrator, La. Dep't of Employment
Security, 300 So. 2d 527 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1974).
65. 250 La. 623, 197 So. 2d 648 (1967).
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families in order to force them to accept the employer's
terms."66 The majority also reasoned that denying un-
employment compensation in circumstances of a lockout
would encourage the employer to resort to this aggressive
measure, in derogation of peaceful negotiations at the bar-
gaining table.6 7
Chief Justice Sanders dissented in the case68 in an opinion
joined by Justices Summers and Barham. In their view the
majority opinion in National Gypsum upsets the state's posi-
tion of neutrality in labor disputes by undermining the effec-
tiveness of the lockout as an economic weapon available to
the employer during a labor dispute. 69
Where one comes out in the National Gypsum case de-
pends on one's point of view and on an assessment of the
consequences of ruling one way or the other in the case. The
statute itself is hardly clear on the matter. For the writer, the
majority's position makes good sense because it keeps the
parties at the bargaining table during contract negotiations
and it tends to keep the plant open too. This is as it should be
in an enlightened era of labor-management relationships.
Commissioner of Insurance
Employers-Commercial Union Insurance Co. v. Bernard70
is an important case affecting the authority of the Commis-
sioner of Insurance to regulate insurance premium rates in
the state. The First Circuit Court of Appeal held that regula-
tion of premium rates is exclusively the business of the
Louisiana Insurance Rating Commission, 71 but the supreme
court reversed, holding that the Commissioner of Insurance
has the authority to investigate premium rates, hold hear-
ings, and prohibit charging excessive rates under the provi-
sions of Louisiana R.S. 22:1214-17. The court rejected the
66. 313 So. 2d at 233.
67. Id. at 234.
68. Id. at 234 (Sanders, C.J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 235.
70. 303 So. 2d 728 (La. 1974). Chief Justice Sanders and Justice Barham
dissented. They were of the view that the receipt of premiums fixed in
conformity to the Louisiana Insurance Code is not an unfair method of
competition or a deceptive trade practice, and hence the Insurance Commis-
sioner has no authority to disapprove of these rates.
71. Employers-Commercial Union Ins. Co. v. Bernard, 286 So. 2d 445 (La.
App. 1st Cir. 1973).
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argument that rates legally filed and not disapproved by the
Rating Commission are immune from examination by the
Commissioner of Insurance: "This is not the scheme of the
act. Rate filings may be disapproved or found ineffective at
any time. ' 72 The case is a significant victory for the Insur-
ance Commissioner, confirming the broad power of his office
over a matter vitally affecting the citizens of Louisiana.
ADMINISTRATrIE PROCEDURE GENERALLY
Delegation Doctrine
Occasionally in administrative adjudication a respondent
argues that the legislature has unlawfully delegated legisla-
tive power to the agency in question and that, as a conse-
quence, he is free from agency regulation. This argument
springs from the idea of separation of powers: the legislature
must do the legislating, not the agency, and so statutes set-
ting up an agency must, it is said, "establish a sufficient basic
standard and rule of action for the guidance of the instru-
mentality or officer that is to administer the law."7 3 Other-
wise the agency is free, in its discretion, to fashion primary
policy, a result that is inconsistent with the idea of separation
of powers. About twenty years ago in Louisiana, the doctrine
of unlawful delegation of legislative power was quite popular,
both with counsel who argued the point and with judges who
sustained it. In those days the Louisiana Supreme Court reg-
ularly struck down the legislature's use of the administrative
process to solve the many new problems of our emerging
modern technology.74 Today, however, the cases allow far
more room for the legislature to delegate regulatory respon-
sibility to administrative agencies, and this term's Johnson v.
Pearce,75 involving the State Livestock Sanitary Board, is an
indication of the new mood.
72. 303 So. 2d at 733.
73. City of Alexandria v. Alexandria Fire Fighters Ass'n, 220 La. 754, 57
So. 2d 673 (1952).
74. Tichenor Antiseptic Co. v. Schwegmann Bros. Giant Super Mkts, 231
La. 51, 90 So. 2d 343 (1956) is the leading case. Accord, Ezell v. City-Parish
Plumbing Bd. of Baton Rouge, 234 La. 441, 100 So. 2d 464 (1958); State v.
Morrow, 231 La. 572, 92 So. 2d 70 (1956).
75. 313 So. 2d 812 (La. 1975). But Justice Summers' point, in his dissent,
that the Board under the challenged act has too much discretion to decide
whether and when to quarantine has some merit. There is indeed a potential
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
Under Louisiana R.S. 3:2223 the Livestock Sanitary
Board has the authority to "promulgate necessary rules and
regulations" to effectuate the state's policy of eradication of
brucellosis; the statute inaugurates a program to prevent
reinfection of livestock with brucellosis. Respondent, whose
cattle were under investigation by the Board, claimed that
the statute unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to
the administrative agency. The supreme court disagreed,
with only Justice Summers dissenting.76 The court noted that
section 2223 is similar to federal regulations on the same
subject which have been sustained against the complaint of
unlawful delegation. What the Louisiana statute delegates is
not the responsibility of fixing primary policy-the statute
itself fixes that; it delegates only the power "to supply the
details for furthering that legislative policy through the use
of veterinary science in a time when that science is changing
and progressing too rapidly for the legislature to adopt any
detailed long-range program. '77 The court concluded that
there is no unlawful delegation of legislative power in sec-
tions 2221 and 2223.
Thus the Louisiana jurisprudence on the delegation doc-
trine now reflects the federal administrative pattern that the
legislature, so long as it sets the primary standard, may leave
to the administrative agency the "power to fill up the details"
of the administrative scheme. 7 The supreme court did say in
the Johnson case, however, that if the agency adopts rules and
for abuse of what amounts to prosecutorial power under the act. But this
problem is not new to administrative procedure. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETION-
ARY JUSTICE 1, passim (1969). Just what to do about controlling prosecuto-
rial discretion has never been determined, however. At least Justice Sum-
mers deserves credit for broaching the subject in his dissent.
The subject of alleged abuse of the Livestock Sanitary Board's quaran-
tine power arose in another case decided during the term. In Louisiana
Livestock Sanitary Bd. v. Prather, 301 So. 2d 688 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1974), the
court noted: "We do not feel that the plaintiff should be precluded forever
from enforcing its regulations due to the fact that it has not aggressively
enforced them in the past or because it has failed to enforce them as to other
violators." 301 So. 2d at 691. However, the court did not explain its statement,
and the equal protection issue is by no means that easy.
76. Id. at 815.
77. Id. at 819.
78. In United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85
(1932), the United States Supreme Court articulated the federal pattern as
follows: "But Congress may declare its will, and, after fixing a primary
standard, devolve upon administrative officers the 'power to fill up the de-
tails' by prescribing administrative rules and regulations."
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regulations exceeding the limitations of the enabling legisla-
tion's purpose, or if it takes action inconsistent with the
state's declared policy, redress may be had in the courts on
judicial review. 79
Standing To Sue
The law on standing to sue has gradually eased more and
more plaintiffs into court to challenge agency action; it is
enough today that plaintiff has suffered an injury in fact,
including competitive injury in fact. The leading federal cases
to this effect are Association of Data Processing Service Or-
ganizations v. Camp80 and Barlow v. Collins."' Both were cited
this term in Justice Tate's opinion for the court in Louisiana
Independent Auto Dealers Ass'n v. State,82 and Louisiana's
law on standing to sue now reflects the federal injury in fact
idea.
Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
Ordinarily, before an aggrieved party can seek judicial
review in Louisiana, as elsewhere, he must first exhaust
available administrative remedies. But there are exceptions to
the requirement of exhaustion, including the idea that when
an agency is proceeding unlawfully, its process need not be
exhausted by an aggrieved party. In Louisiana Milk Commis-
sion v. Louisiana Commission on Government Ethics83 the
court of appeal held that the State Ethics Commission has no
jurisdiction to order the removal of several members of the
Milk Commission for alleged conflict of interest based on the
fact that these members represent the milk industry on the
Commission. The law requires these members to have an
economic interest in the milk industry in Louisiana,84 and,
consequently, the State Ethics Commission has no authority
to rule that such representation violates the State Ethics
Code.8 5 Moreover, the members of the Milk Commission who
were threatened with removal from office did not have to
submit to the Ethics Commission's administrative process be-
79. 313 So. 2d at 819.
80. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
81. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
82. 295 So. 2d 796 (La. 1974).
83. 298 So. 2d 285 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974).
84. See LA. R.S. 40:940.16 (1965).
85. LA. R.S. 42:1101 (1965).
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fore seeking judicial review, because that agency was pro-
ceeding unlawfully in the first place.
Agency Investigatory Powers
It would make little sense to authorize an administrative
agency to enforce a particular regulatory scheme but deny
the agency the necessary investigatory powers to do its job
under the act. Fortunately, in Warren v. State Department of
Labor,8 6 the first circuit rejected the claim that the Commis-
sioner of Labor has no subpoena power to investigate possible
violations of Louisiana R.S. 23:898, which prohibits transpor-
tation of strikebreakers into Louisiana. Louisiana R.S. 23:11
sets out the Commissioner's power regarding compulsory pro-
cess, and under that provision the Commissioner of Labor can
issue subpoenas to compel the attendance of witnesses and
the production of documents as in civil proceedings. The court
of appeal also rejected the argument that allowing the Com-
missioner of Labor to investigate possible violations of a stat-
ute carrying a criminal penalty usurps the power of the
district attorney. That is not true, the court ruled, because an
investigation by the Labor Commissioner in no way hinders
the district attorney's office's own investigation. Moreover,
the Department of Labor may legitimately conduct investiga-
tions for many purposes other than development of evidence
for the enforcement of the criminal law, and nothing in the
record suggested to the court that the Commissioner of Labor
was motivated solely by the purpose of developing a criminal
case.17
The first circuit's conclusions in the Warren case seem
sensible enough to the writer. Front-line responsibility for
investigating labor problems in Louisiana should be left to
the Commissioner of Labor, who is intimately familiar with
this state's labor laws and who, it would seem, has primary,
but not exclusive, jurisdiction in the matter.8
Public Records Law
It seems the public's "right to know" is in the air lately,
and the 1974-75 term produced a ruling from the first circuit
86. 313 So. 2d 6 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
87. Id. at 11.
88. For a discussion of the idea of primary jurisdiction, see K. DAVIS,
ADMINISTRATVE LAW TEXT § 19.01 (3d ed. 1972).
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in favor of broad disclosure of governmental information
under the Louisiana Public Records Law. 89 Bartels v. Rous-
sel 90 holds that departmental budget requests of the Baton
Rouge City Parish government are subject to public disclo-
sure under Louisiana R.S. 44:1, notwithstanding the City-
Parish's argument that these requests were only tentative
since they had not yet been acted upon by the city's mayor-
president. The court ruled that the requests were, in the
words of the statute, "being in use" and, as a result, they
were subject to discovery under Louisiana R.S. 44:32, a provi-
sion guaranteeing the right of the public to examine public
documents and requiring their custodian to allow access to
them. The first circuit stated that "the right of the public to
be adequately informed is of fundamental importance," 91 and
it thought it imperative that the Public Records Law be lib-
erally construed so as to extend rather than restrict access to
public records. The first circuit's ruling extending disclosure
in the Bartels case is consistent with what appears to be the
Louisiana Supreme Court's attitude in favor of broad public
access to governmental information and decision-making.92
89. LA. R.S. 44:1-39 (1951).
90. 303 So. 2d 833 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 307 So. 2d 372 (La.
1975).
91. 303 So. 2d at 838.
92. Cf. Reeves v. Orleans Parish School Bd., 281 So. 2d 719 (La. 1973).
